Dr. Frank Porter Graham, former president of the University of North Carolina, made this statement into the Congressional Record when he was a senator from North Carolina in 1949. This was made based on his intimate knowledge of the Indonesian Revolution, having served as chairman of the United Nations Committee of Good Offices for Indonesia in 1947 and 1948, leading to the Renville Treaty.

The statement is presented here as part of a virtual exhibition on Frank Porter Graham’s role in negotiations for the recognition of Indonesian independence. See the homepage for the exhibition here. This statement has been pulled from the Congressional Record of April 5, 1949 (81st Congress, Senate, 95, vol. 3, pp. 3839-3849). It has been rendered here in searchable text to make it more accessible.

INTRODUCTION

The violation of the Renville agreement by the Government of the Netherlands, the violation of the still standing cease-fire order passed by the Security Council on August 1, 1947, the disregard of the functions of the United Nations Committee of Good Offices, the renunciation of the procedures of peace for a ·recourse to force of arms and the continuing defiance this winter of two separate orders of the Security Council, constitute a challenge to the United Nations of grave import for the whole world. This challenge will continue until the democratic principles of the Renville agreement, signed by the representatives of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia under the auspices of the United Nations, are fulfilled. Unfulfilled, the Renville agreement remains a sounding-board for propaganda against the western democracies all over the Eastern World. Fulfilled, the Renville agreement, with its foundation on the Linggadjati agreement, can become, to the greatness of the Dutch and the Indonesians, a charter of freedom for the colonial peoples of the world.

The two main sources of opposition to the democratic principles of the Renville agreement are two small but powerful combinations: (1) The Dutch financial-imperialistic-militaristic-paternalistic combination which first misleads and then misrepresents the great Dutch people; and (2) the Soviet dictators, who first mislead and then misrepresent the great Russian people. Both the Dutch imperialists and the Russian imperialists are opposed to the basic principles of the Renville agreement such as: Civil liberties at all times, unhampered communication, transportation, and exchange, plebiscites or free elections after full discussion, and a free constitutional convention organized by democratic procedure with representation in. proportion to the population. The Dutch imperialists do not intend that these principles of freedom be available to all the leaders of Indonesia for free appeals to the Indonesian people. Free leadership in fair and open discussion would insure that the guiding principle of the United States of Indonesia would not be Dutch domination but Indonesian self-determination. The combination of Soviet dictators not only does not want these principles applied in Korea, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Germany, but also does not want them publicized within the Soviet Union itself. Neither imperialism nor dictatorship can long exist with the morally enduring Renville principles of freedom and self-determination. Imperialists, in their case, and dictators, in their situation, will violate agreements by which such principles might get high international sanction for application by peoples in colonies, in satellite states, or in the vast dominions behind the iron curtain.

There will be much talk, some of it partly true, (1) about Republican incapacity to prevent atrocious incidents caused largely, however, by the non-implementation of the agreement; (2) about former collaboration by a few of the present Republican leaders with the Japanese; and (3) about Communist infiltration in some of the political parties and some of the labor unions in the Republic. It should be recalled in this connection that atrocities have not all been confined to one side; that some of the Indonesian Republican leaders fought underground in Holland against the Germans, and that more fought underground in Indonesia against the Japanese. More revealing still was the decisive crushing of the Communist revolt by the moderate Republican Government. There will also be much talk by the Soviet imperialists about American and British imperialism seeking at one and the same time to uphold and to supplant Dutch imperialism. The propaganda about American and British imperialism, Japanese collaboration, and Communist infiltration should not obscure for the United Nations the basic simple fact that Republican aspirations have their main. source in Indonesian self-determination.

The committee condemned by both extremes: The members of the first Committee of Good Offices, which included Mr. Justice Richard C. Kirby, of Australia; Dr. Paul van Zeeland, of Belgium; and myself, as the American representative, were accused by some of the Dutch imperialists of being in league with the Republic of Indonesia against the Kingdom of the Netherlands. At the same time I was repeatedly accused by the Moscow radio of being a tool of American capitalism and of intimidating the Republicans into accepting the Renville agreement with threats of atomic bombs and American power.

With a position of balance between being an alleged conspirator against the Dutch and being an alleged intimidator of the Indonesians, I have some sense of balance shared by my highly esteemed former colleagues of the committee. Beholden neither to the imperialists of the right nor to the imperialists of the left, but beholden to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, I make the present analysis of some of the basic factors and issues involved. Having been in the Senate less than a week, I will not make a statement at length here, but will put it in the RECORD for any value it may have for the Members of the Senate.

Part of this analysis is based on our report to the Security Council, February a year ago, and part of it is based on unrestricted documents and on developments publicly reported since our able successors took over from us February a year ago. I hope in this analysis to give one person’s glimpse of (1) the two great peoples and their spirit; (2) the international position of Indonesia; (3) the Indonesian nationalist movement; (4) the formation of the Republic of Indonesia; (5) the efforts of British diplomats to help the Netherlands and the Republic settle their dispute, resulting in the Linggadjati agreement; (6) the break-down in negotiations and the Dutch “police action” of July 21, 1946; (7) the intervention of the United Nations with a cease-fire resolution and a Committee of Good Offices; (8) the function, limitations, and work of the committee; (9) the negotiations of the representatives of the two governments; (10) the Renville agreement; (11) the opportunity for good will and early implementation; (12) an analysis of the controversial issues of sovereignty, separate states, and the provisional government; (13) the du Bois Chritchley plan; (14) the Cochran plan; (15) the policy patterns of delays and rejections; (16) incidents and atrocities; (17) the crushing of the Communist revolt by the Republic; (18) the breaking of the truce by the Dutch and the second “police action”; (19) the Renville principles and the obligations of the United Nations; and (20) the opportunities of two great peoples through the fulfillment of the Linggadjati and Renville agreements in cooperation with the United Nations to salvage a terrible situation destructive to both peoples and critical for mankind.

I. THE TWO GREAT PEOPLES

It was our opportunity in Batavia and Djokjakarta to broadcast from the opposing capitals and to seek to interpret to the two peoples, deeply distrustful to each other, the best of the traditions and hopes of the Dutch to the Indonesians, and the best of the traditions and hopes of the Indonesians to the Dutch.

A. The Dutch

For centuries the Netherlands has been the home of the humane and fine arts and the fountainhead of freedom and international law. Erasmus, of Rotterdam, was one of the three or four greatest minds and noblest spirits of the age of the Renaissance and the Reformation. Hugo Grotius and The Hague have given the Netherlands a preeminent position in maritime and international law, as have Rembrandt and the Dutch school in painting, Leeuwenhoek in the invention of the microscope, and Huygens in science and mathematics, whose fundamental work prepared the way for the great synthesis of Sir Isaac Newton in his theory of gravitation.

The rise of the Dutch Republic has long been an inspiration to the United States and other republics. William the Silent and the House of Nassau through the centuries are among the great names in the democratic history of the west. William of Orange, as William III, with Mary, was the first of the long line of the British kings who have signed the Bill of Rights, which was the constitutional collective bargain of the people with their king, and since 1689 has been the charter of British liberties. Long the haven of the refugees from tyranny anywhere, Holland has been the dauntless champion of freedom and tolerance in critical times of tension and conflict. The Pilgrims, refugees from old England, received a fresh transfusion of liberty in Holland on their way to America, where they made Plymouth Rock one of the cornerstones of self-government in the modern world. The Dutch were the founders of New York, among the leaders of the revolt against the British Empire and the builders of the American Republic. The Dutch have given America in the Vanderbilts and Rockefellers the builders of mighty structures of commerce and industry. The Dutch have given America and the world in Roosevelt one of the great names in history-Theodore, the father of the square deal and the new nationalism; Franklin, the father of the New Deal and forgotten millions, one of the authors of the Atlantic Charter, which affirms the right of every people to choose their own form of government, and one of the architects of the United Nations whose Charter commits 58 nations to the principle that nations with dependent areas are responsible to the world community; and Eleanor, one of the framers of the international bill of rights. The pledge of the noble Queen Wilhelmina in 1942 is a fundamental document which will find its fulfillment in the implementation of the Linggadjati and Renville agreements.

The people of the Netherlands, with their stubborn dykes and generous blood, have written some,. of the most heroic chapters in the history of liberty-a little land but a great people.

B. The Indonesians

The history and people of Indonesia are interwoven with the history and people of Malaya, India, China, Melanesia, Polynesia, Australia, Europe, and America. In Indonesia are some of the earliest relics of man from the Pleistocene age. In Indonesia. were majestic monuments, noble shrines, and an advanced civilization before western men discovered America or rounded Africa to the Spice Islands. The old empires, whether based on Sumatra, such as Atjeh, or based on Java and Sumatra, such as Bantam, had their times of power astride the channels between the seas. Java, the granary of many islands through the ages, was often the central base of the empire of the islands, whether the wide and elaborate Madjapahit of the Indian heyday or Mataram of nostalgic glory.

The Spice Islands of the Indies were the luring motive force which, added to the spirit of exploration, helped to cause the discovery of America, the rounding of Africa, a redirection of commerce, and the commercial revolution.

The East Indies became the eastern pivot upon which in the Western World the medieval turned to the modern age.

With the crossing of early southern Pacific stocks and their persisting polyglot dialects have evolved a basic Malayan language, persistent mores, and traditions, and a common Indonesian consciousness. The Island of Java, perhaps the most densely populated area in the world, which has been the base of the Republican movement, has three distinct groups: The Sundanese in west Java, the Javanese in central Java, and the Madurese in east Java. The leaders of the Indonesians in the islands east of Java who have cooperated with the Dutch were much disturbed by the Dutch attack on the Republic. These various regional groups, whether in Java, Sumatra, and Madura, the areas of republican activity, or in Dutch Borneo or in east Indonesia, are all parts of the Indonesian nationalist movement. The most militant leadership is in the area of the Republic. A good number of non-republican Indonesian former civil servants have chosen to cooperate with the Dutch. Moreover, a number of genuine nationalists have risen to leadership in the non-republican Indonesian states. It is significant that the governments of the two most important of these non-republican states resigned immediately following the Dutch resort to force in December.

Indonesia, because of its history, location, and values, is a vital subject in the study of anthropology, archeology, the botanical sciences, tropical medicine, and the history of ancient, medieval, and modern times. The peoples of Indonesia have an imposing indigenous tradition of local self-government rooted in the communal village. They preserve a stubborn body of laws and customs handed down in their adats, a stable tradition of irrigation and agriculture, handicrafts, music, dancing, and fine arts, Despite a wide illiteracy, they have a notable intelligence,. a high capacity for languages and culture measured by the opportunities available to the few. With all the many high values added by the Dutch in science, technology, economic production, medicine, public health, and civil administration, the Netherlands have not effectively promoted the general education of the youth of Indonesia. It has been estimated that 40 percent of the people in the American Philippines were literate as compared with the 7 percent of the people in the Dutch East Indies. This is one of the sources of the deep sense of grievance for their people on the part of the Indonesian republican leaders who are themselves the products of the excellent training and democratic influences of the historic Dutch universities. The Dutch policy seems to have been to encourage the education of a few leaders but not to promote the education of the great body of the people.

General among the Indonesian people are a natural intelligence, friendliness, innate courtesy, beautiful rhythm, grace, and human dignity. The 70,000,000 Indonesian people have in common the national aspiration for freedom, independence, and cooperation.

II. THE INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF INDONESIA

A. Geography

The national aspiration of the Indonesian people is of special concern to the world because of the strategic international position of their islands. These islands are geographically the landways between two great continents, Asia and Australia, and the seaways between two great oceans, the Indian and the vast Pacific. The Straits of Malacca, which divide Indonesia and Asia and connect the Indian and Pacific Oceans, is the quickest water route between the largest masses of the earth’s people in India and China. It is part of the chief international water route between Europe and Asia and between the two hemispheres. These islands are also a strategic part of some of the world’s major air routes which will increase in international importance as the air lines multiply their travel around the earth.

B. Economic Values

Indonesia ls economically a region of the potential production of some of the most important foods, medicines, minerals, and the sources of motive power for industrial production and commercial transportation on land, sea, and in the air. Because of the long blockade many people almost naked desperately need textiles, sick people need medicines, and youth need books. Hungry people in the world need the rice, corn, tapioca, fruits, fats, and sugar of Indonesia. The malarial need quinine. Hungry engines need the oil; the automobiles and planes need the rubber of Java and Sumatra. Indonesian products are required for the body and work of man in both hemispheres. Real peace and maximum production are terribly needed in all the continents and all the islands to house and feed the bodies, minds, and souls of hungry and fearful peoples all over the earth. Relentless and cooperative efforts for peace and productivity are still required by the United Nations.

C. Religious and political repercussions in the world

Not only is Indonesia geographically strategic in place and economically strategic in time, but also the Indonesian people are religiously a part of the three great religious groups of the world: The Moslem, the Hindu, and the Christian. Ninety percent of the people are Mohammedans. Indonesia has religious relations which transcend national boundaries in the inter-hemispheric connections of a dynamic Islam. The events in their islands have definite repercussions in the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Britain, Australia, Egypt, the Near East, Pakistan, India, Malaya, China, Russia, the Philippines, the United States, and in the United Nations with economic, political, and moral reverberations on all the continents of the earth.The United Nations cannot let go the Indonesian case as one of the hot spots of the earth with a high potential for conflict which may transcend the tension of a region and threaten the peace of the world. There is no island isolation from the seas around, the air above, or the continents beyond. The dynamic interdependent economic framework which embraces the earth and holds up the structure of the modern world may most unexpectedly catch up a local high tension or a regional conflict anywhere and involve peoples everywhere.

The United Nations is organizing around this earth a correspondingly interdependent political framework of conciliation, good offices, mediation, and arbitration for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the insulation of the high potentials of the dynamic society of our modern world. The United Nations cannot in good faith withdraw from Indonesia.

Indonesia is not in the private backyard of Holland; with its 70,000,000 people, with its location athwart the international crossways, and with its significance for human freedom, peace, and production, Indonesia is in the front yard of the world. Justice, freedom, and peace in Indonesia are a continuing responsibility and opportunity of the United Nations. To shirk this obligation is to renounce the Charter of the United Nations, and the moral foundations upon which the United Nations must stand to survive as an effective force for peace in the world.

III. THE INDONESIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

Back of the present crisis is the Indonesian nationalist movement which has been gathering momentum for over 40 years. This movement must be viewed against a background of over four centuries of colonialism. European nations fought maritime and commercial wars for the control of the Indies.

The Portuguese Empire and the Dutch Empire, with outposts on four continents in two hemispheres, were both based on the East Indies. The Portuguese period included the sixteenth century with a relic today in Portuguese Timor. The period of the Dutch East India·Co. included the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The period of direct responsibility of the sovereign government of the Netherlands included the nineteenth and twentieth centuries which was to have been ended, according to recent promise, if possible, on January 1, 1949. After the interlude of the French Revolution and the consequent brief period of English control under Raffles, the founder of Singapore, the century of direct control by the Netherlands divides into three historical Dutch periods. The period from·1800-70 is called by the Dutch historians the Culture Period, with its forced labor, taxes in produce, monopole consignments to Holland and state profits. The score of years from 1870 to 1890 was called the liberal period with free enterprise, private production, and private profits. At the turn of the century, came the ethical period with increasing Dutch concern for the welfare of the Indonesian people. During the last 40 years has been the period of the Indonesian nationalist movement.

Among the early influences and continuing developments making for an Indonesian national consciousness were the letters of the charming young Indonesian woman, Adjeng Kartini, to her friends in Holland. These were published early in the century after her untimely death as beautiful expression of the Indonesian spirit and gave rise to schools for girls and an Indonesian women’s movement. Widespread among the people was the Glorious Endeavor (the Boedi Oetomi [sic]), with its indigenous Indonesian program of enlightenment and social well-being under Oesada and Soetomo. With a religious dynamic arose the Sarekat Islam, under Hadji Salim and Tjodro [sic], with its revival of a truer Mohammedanism and its intellectual and economic development of the Indonesian people. The Volksraad, an embryo parliament, founded by enlightened Dutch statesmanship, sometimes used as a delaying tactic, became, according to its real purpose, increasingly Indonesian. The Dutch have in many ways been the world’s best colonial ·administrators. Tragically for themselves, the combination in present power has not caught up with the trends of the age.

The religious, economic, and cultural movements indigenous among the people themselves were provided with able leadership by Indonesian students upon their return from those excellent, historic, and creative centers of culture, skills, freedom, and democracy, the University of Leyden and the other colleges and universities of the Netherlands. Giving further impetus to the nationalist movement were the labor movement, the youth movement, and the political parties, the parties of the right led by Soekiman, Roem, and others, and the National Indonesian Party led by Ali Sastroamidjojo and others; the parties of the left once led by Sjahrir, Sjarifoeddin, Sediadjit, and others; the Communist Party formerly led by Aliman [sic] and Moeso; the Christian Party led by Lemeina. Leaders without party ties but possessed of eminent ability, stanchness of purpose, and magnetic powers of leadership are President Soekarno and Prime Minister Hatta. All these movements·and organizations were expressions of the Indonesian nationalism which would not only be satisfied with the Dutch-Indonesian transition from the government of the Indonesians by the Dutch for the Dutch to the government of the Indonesians by the Dutch for the Dutch and the Indonesian, but which would roll on in gathering power as part of the irresistible trend of the age until there would be established the government of the Indonesians for the Indonesians and by the Indonesians in a union with the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Contributing also to the Asiatic and Pacific self-consciousness of the Indonesian people were the rise of Japan; the Chinese Revolution; the economic isolation and self-dependence of Indonesia caused by two world wars and a world depression; the reorientation of the economy of Indonesia as a gradually increasing part of the economy of the Pacific; and the liberation of Egypt, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, and the Philippines, oceanic neighbors of Indonesia. Two other influences from opposite sources added to the dynamics of the gathering revolutionary movements in Indonesia, the Russian Revolution which spread abroad after the First World War and the Japanese conquests which were a spectacular part of the Second World War. Japan took the most strategic parts of Indonesia from the Netherlands with decisive blows to the damage of the prestige of the western nations and with a new impetus to the eastern consciousness expressed in its slogan “Asia for the Asiatics.”

IV. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE BY THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

With the juncture of all these movements, forces, currents, and undercurrents, the most militant leaders of the Indonesian nationalism, some of whom had been imprisoned, at one time or another, before the Second World War by the Dutch, and during the war by the Japanese, seized the hour of the Allied liberation of Indonesia from the Japanese for the liberation of Indonesia from the Dutch. They set up a provisional congress and issued the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Indonesia with its plans for the inclusion of all the Indonesian people. While acknowledging the sovereignty of the Netherlands throughout the Indies, the Allied commanders dealt with the leaders of the Republic of Indonesia on the basis of the fact that the Republic exercised de facto authority.

Some of the most militant leaders of the Republican movement had fought in the Indonesian underground against the Japanese, some had fought in the Dutch underground against the Germans, and others had collaborated with the Japanese and remained above ground. Whether of the parties of the right, right center, center, left center, or left; whether underground fighters or above-ground collaborators, all had in common the Nationalist movement for the freedom and independence of the 70,000,000 Indonesian people.

V. BRITISH DIPLOMATS PRESIDE OVER LINGGADJATI NEGOTIATIONS

Enlisted to help the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia to·end hostilities, effectuate a truce and frame principles for the settlement of their political dispute, were two of the most eminent British career diplomats, Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, now Lord Inverchapel, and Lord Killearn stationed at Singapore. The two governments were represented by some of their ablest men. Dr. Schemerhorn, Chairman of the Dutch Commission-General, and former Prime Minister Dr. Hubertus J. van Mook, Lt. Governor General, and the Republican delegation headed by Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir, chairman of the Republican delegation, and Hadji Salim, both of whom, with Soekarno and Hatta, were recently held as prisoners. The result was the justly famous Linggadjati Agreement.

In this agreement the representatives of the Netherlands, while always holding to the theory of the over-all Dutch sovereignty throughout the Dutch East Indies, (1) recognized the Republic as exercising de facto authority in Java, Sumatra, and Madura. The two governments agreed to cooperate: (2) for the establishment of a sovereign, democratic state on a federal basis, to be known as the United States of Indonesia; (3) for the framing of the Constitution of the United States of Indonesia by a national constituent assembly chosen by democratic procedures; (4) for the formation of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union under the King of the Netherlands with organs of their own to promote the joint interests of both countries; (5) for setting up a joint commission to effectuate the restoration and restitution of rights and properties of all non-Indonesians; (6) for the recognition that the component states of the United States of Indonesia shall be the Republic, Borneo and the great east, without prejudice to the right of the population of any territory to decide by a democratic procedure that its position in the United States of Indonesia shall be otherwise defined; (7) for the establishment of the United States of Indonesia and the Netherlands Indonesian Union before January 1, 1949; (8) for the reduction of the armed forces directly after the conclusion of this agreement; (9) and for resort to arbitration of any dispute arising from this agreement which cannot be solved by joint consultation. These are 9 of the 17 provisions and contain most of the basic principles of the justly famous Linggadjati Agreement.

VI. THE. BREAK-DOWN IN NEGOTIATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION AND THE DUTCH POLICE ACTION OF JULY 21, 1947

The Linggadjati agreement was initialed on November 15, 1946, and was signed by the governments on March 25, 1947. The negotiations for the implementation of the agreement broke down. The Republicans charged the Netherlands: (1) With making unilateral interpretations contrary to the provisions of the agreement; and (2) with a failure to have recourse to an arbitration provision in the agreement. The Netherlands charged the Republic with both the refusal and the incapacity to carry out the provisions of the agreement. On the night of July 20, 1947, the Netherlands ordered the police action. This police action was undertaken, according to views and assertions of the Dutch, to restore law and order, to punish lawless bands, to prevent massacres of Chinese and others by irregular forces, to stop sabotage, and to step up production in a time of desperate need. According to the assertions of republicans the police action was a military action taken, when the army had been mustered in full force, to prevent the implementation of the Linggadjati agreement, to take over large economic resources and assets in republican areas, to organize new states in former republican territories behind Dutch military lines, to carry out a policy of economic strangling and political splintering of the Republic, and to insure the Dutch control of the proposed United States of Indonesia.

The well-trained and mechanized Dutch military forces quickly took over large parts of Java and Sumatra.

VII. THE UNITED NATIONS INTERVENES

On the initiative of India and Australia, the Security Council acted to stop the fighting in Indonesia as a threat to world peace. The cease-fire resolution was passed August l, 1947. August 25 the Council requested that consular representatives of Council members in Batavia to prepare jointly re- ports on the observance of the cease-fire order and the situation in the Republic and in areas under military occupation; the Council also tendered its good offices to the parties through three members of the Council. November 1, the Council noting from the report of the Consular Commission that the cessation of hostilities was not fully effective, called upon the parties ( 1) to consult with each other or through the Committee of Good Offices as to the means to be employed in order to give effect to the ceasefire resolution of August 1, and, pending agreement, to cease any activities or incitements of activities which contravene that resolution, and to take appropriate measures for safeguarding life and property; (2) requested the Committee of Good Offices to assist the parties in reaching an agreement on an arrangement which will assure observance of the ceasefire resolution, requested the Consular Commission, together with its military assistants, to make its services available to the Committee of Good Offices; and (3) advised the parties concerned, the Committee, and the Commission that its resolution of August 1 should be interpreted as meaning that the use of armed forces of either party by hostile action to extend its control over territory not occupied by it on August 4, 1947, as inconsistent with the Council resolution of the 1st of August.

VIII. THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES

In accordance with the Security Council resolution, the Committee of Good Offices was composed of three nations: Australia, chosen by the Republic of Indonesia; Belgium, chosen by the Kingdom of the Netherlands; and the United States, chosen by Belgium and Australia. Dr. Paul van Zeeland, former Prime Minister of Belgium and one time President of the Assembly of the League of Nations, was chosen to represent Belgium. Mr. Justice Richard C. Kirby, of the Australian Court of Arbitration, was chosen to represent Australia. These two eminently able representatives and the American representative worked cooperatively and relentlessly as representatives of the United Nations with emphasis always on the responsibilities of the parties to work out an agreement.

The republicans had hoped for a board of arbitration or at least a board of mediation. The Security Council provided a Committee of Good Offices.

The committee at all times was up against such realities as: (1) Not only the lack of power to act as arbitrators but also the lack of power even to mediate the dispute, and, therefore, (2) the lack of power to make public its suggestions to the parties; (3) the necessity for the committee to be unanimous in order for its confidential suggestions to the parties to have some moral power;·(4) the power of either one of the parties to continue to veto any suggestion of the committee even when unanimous; (5) the possibility of the political overthrow of either cabinet on the realinement [sic] of the political parties on the basis of the negotiations in the Indonesian dispute; (6) the possibility of negative action on recommendations of the committee in the Security Council by one veto or a combination of negative votes or abstentions from voting; (7) the lack of instant public consideration by the Assembly; (8) the lack of any original juris. diction of the World Court over individuals who commit crimes against the Charter of the United Nations; and (9) the lack of an effective international police force to enforce the decisions of the United Nations.

There were several additional barriers obstructing a settlement. One was the original plan of the Republic to be the over-all government rather than to be a part of the federal government of the promised new United States of Indonesia. In view of the adamant position of the Netherlands and the wisdom of the federal principle, the leaders of the Republic wisely gave up the plan for one centralized government over all Indonesia. Another republican factor was the bitter memories of the police action by which the Dutch armies overran republican territories and held many large economic assets and many millions of people formerly in republican territories behind Dutch military lines entirely cut off from the Republic. A factor common to both governments was the long and bitter distrust of each government by the other government regarding its ability or will to keep agreements when made. A strong obstructing Dutch factor was the underlying and not always submerged determination of some powerful economic and political interests in the Netherlands not really to use the Committee of Good Offices and to eliminate the Republic from any real part in the preparation for and the organization of the promised United States of Indonesia. It was for these many reasons our committee was warned by officials of several nations that the committee was embarked on an almost hopeless mission. With awareness of the difficulties and without illusions as to its own powers, but because of its faith in the Dutch and Indonesian peoples and out of a real devotion to the great purposes of the United Nations, the committee entered the plane bound for Indonesia with determination and hope.

The meeting place for negotiations

The stubborn, reciprocal distrust and the two governments immediately confronted the committee in the strong position of the Republic not to have the negotiations in Indonesia, because Dutch-controlled, and in the strong preference of the Dutch for meeting in Indonesia, as the location of the dispute. After many set-backs during several weeks, the committee, on the petition of the Australian and Belgian representatives, induced the United States Government, reluctant because of possible misrepresentation, to provide the ably administered United States naval transport Renville as a meeting place acceptable to both parties.

Before the coming of the Renville, the committee, by flying constantly between the two capitals with informal suggestions to the representatives of the two governments, sought to prepare the way for later joint conferences. Technical committees, organized by the two governments in cooperation with special representatives of the committee, composed of Glenn Abbey, United States chairman; Alfred Brooks, Australia; and F. K. Clayes-Bouvert, Belgium, undertook to work out a joint program for a truce. Procedures were considered for negotiations regarding political principles. The Netherlands insisted the truce should come first to develop a more favorable atmosphere for the political settlement. The Republic emphasized that the consideration of the truce and the political principles should be concurrent because of their potentially reciprocal contributions to the success of both.

The committee, with their three delegations and the UN Secretariat, of which T. G. Narayanan was executive secretary, had the continuingly deep sense of appreciation of the faithful work of the two technical committees and the special representatives, of the ability and devotion of the Australian, Belgian, and American Army, Naval and Marine assistants, the skill and daring of the American and Australian fliers to whom mountains and fogs were a constant challenge, the cooperation of the chief consuls of the interested governments in Batavia, and the captain, officers, and seamen of the United States transport Renville who gave over their cabins and quarters to the two delegations and devoted this historic ship to the maximum service of its United Nations mission.

The coming of the “Renville”

The Renville had carried the United States marines ashore on Okinawa, where, with the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, they together captured from brave men the last mighty stronghold guarding the gateways to Japan. The Renville, commanded by the efficient commander and gracious host, Capt. David Tyres, arrived at Batavia December 2. All of the countless ships, which for centuries have come to the shores of Java, no ship ever came with more good will or a higher spirit of service for two great peoples than the United States naval transport Renville.

IX. THE NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO THE “RENVILLE” AGREEMENT

The Committee, through its special representative with the two technical committees, made two major efforts to arrange the basis for a truce. Directly on its own behalf the Committee also made two major efforts to provide a balanced combination of proposals for a truce and proposals for political principles. In the first effort for the truce, the Committee suggested an eight-point program. The Republic accepted in principle all eight points in the program. The Netherlands accepted five points of the program and insisted on their separate adoption. The Republicans insisted that the eight points constituted a balanced program. An impasse resulted. During a brief absence of Dr. Paul van Zeeland, Mr. Raymond Herremanns served as his able deputy and later successor; as did Mr. T. K. Critchley for Mr. Justice Richard C. Kirby.

In the face of this failure, the Committee sought to accelerate the procedures for a truce with a new plan which went far, it thought, to take into reasonable account the points of the Dutch regarding topography, administrative areas, and the welfare of local populations in the determination of the lines of August 4. The Republic accepted the new plan. The Netherlands accepted it as a working paper for discussion. Protracted discussions did not result in its acceptance.

Instead of reporting this failure to the Security Council, except as a part of its regular reports, the Committee again chose rather with stubborn hope to make still another new approach to the parties. Realizing that delays were working against successful negotiations and that Christmas was at hand, the Committee, on the eve of the birth of the Child and of a new hope for the children of men, prepared a combination of proposals for a truce and proposals of political principles. The proposals for the truce were based substantially on the Van Mook line.

The Christmas message

The Van Mook line was based substantially on lines drawn on August 29, 1947, between the forward points of the Dutch lines. The issue was not between the lines of July 20 and the August 4 line, but between the Dutch and Indonesian conception of the lines of August 4 envisaged in the Council resolution of November 1. Since by either conception the August 4 line was to be provisional the most basic consideration was to get an agreement on both a truce and political principles under which the democratic lines would advance according to the self-determination of peoples and the military lines would precede under their provisional nature. The proposals for political principles provided:

1. That the assistance of the Committee of Good Offices be used in the working out and signing of an agreement on the U.S.S. Renville for settlement of the political dispute, in the islands of Java, Sumatra, and Madura between the Government of the Republic and the Government of the Netherlands under the auspices of the Committee.
2. That there be, meanwhile, a cessation of all activities by either Government relating directly or indirectly to the organization of states or to the .determination of political relationship to the United States of Indonesia of territories in Java, Sumatra, and Madura which comprise the area involved in the dispute between the Government of the Netherlands and the Government of the Republic.
3. That on the signing of the political agreement on civil administration which was functioning on July 20, 1947, be restored within a period of not more than 3 months and that within a similar period Netherlands armed forces be withdrawn to territories occupied by them on July 20, 1947.
4. That on the signing of the political agreement provision be made for the gradual reduction of the armed forces of both parties.
5. That after the signing of the agreement, free economic activity, trade, transportation, and communications be completely restored.
6. That provision be made for a suitable period of not less than 6 months not more than 1 year after the signing of the agreement, during which time uncoerced and free discussion and consideration of vital issues will proceed. At the end of this period, free elections will be held for self-determination by the people of their political relationship to the Republic and to the United States of Indonesia.
7. That a constitutional convention be chosen according to democratic procedure to draft a constitution for the United States of Indonesia.
8. That an agency of the United Nations be asked to observe the conditions during this period and the final formation of the United States of Indonesia.

On Christmas Day, our committee unanimously adopted this draft plan including truce proposals and democratic political principles and submitted them informally to the parties on December 26 as an integrated and balanced whole. The Republic, though disappointed in the truce along the van Mook line, accepted the plan as a whole for its political principles of freedom and democracy, independence and union.

Dutch counterproposals in 12 principles

The Netherlands held the Christmas message on an informal basis, and then, as 12 counterproposals, accepted most of the suggestions, rejected parts, and accepted other parts with considerable modifications. The Netherlands then made these proposals formal with indications that, if not accepted unconditionally by the Republic, it would not be bound by the 12 political principles and liberty of action would be resumed. These 12 principles provided, among other things, for the continuance of the assistance of the Committee of Good Offices in the working out of the settlement of the political dispute in Java, Sumatra, and Madura based on the principles underlying the Linggadjati Agreement; for civil and political liberties; that there be no interference with the expression of popular movements looking toward the formation of states in accordance with the principles of the Linggadjati Agreement; that changes in the administration of territory are to be made only with the full and free consent of the population of the territory at a time of security and freedom from coercion; that, on the signing of the political agreement, there would be gradual reduction of the armed forces of both parties; that, on the signing of the truce agreement, there would be resumption of trade, transportation, and communication through the cooperation of the parties; that there be a period of not less than 6 months nor more than 1 year after the signing of the agreement during which uncoerced and free discussion of vital issues should proceed and that at the end of such period free elections would be held for self-determination by the people of their political relations to the United States of Indonesia; provision for serious consideration by one party of the request of the other party for an agency of the United Nations to observe conditions between the signing of the agreement and the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia; provision for the independence of the Indonesian people; cooperation between the peoples of the Netherlands and Indonesia; provision for a sovereign state on a federal basis under a constitution to be arrived at by democratic procedures; and provision for the union of the United States of Indonesia and the other parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands under the King of the Netherlands.

A grave situation

While deeply appreciative of the fact that the 12 political principles contained many basic provisions for freedom, democracy, independence, and cooperation, the Republic was most deeply concerned that there was no guarantee of international observation between the signing of the agreement and the transfer of sovereignty; there was no provision for the representation of the Republic in an interim government; and that there was no mention of the Republic by name in any of the 12 principles.

Aware of its own limitations and in the desperate circumstances of the probable break-down of negotiations, the Committee decided to make still another new approach to the parties. The Committee suggested for the informal consideration of the parties six additional political principles in addition to or in reinforcement of the 12. Pending consideration of the six principles by both parties, the Republic was pondering the accepting or rejection of the status quo military line and the democratic political principles in which were missing several guarantees of deep concern to the Republic.

X. THE TRUCE PLUS 12 PRINCIPLES PLUS 6 PRINCIPLES EQUALS “RENVILLE” AGREEMENT

It soon appeared that the content of the six additional principles, if accepted by the Netherlands, would be decisive as to the acceptance by the Republic of the combined plans as an integrated and balanced whole. The six principles follow:

1. Sovereignty throughout the Netherlands Indies is and shall remain with the Kingdom of the Netherlands until, after a stated interval, the Kingdom of the Netherlands transfers its sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia. Prior to the termination of such stated interval the Kingdom of the Netherlands may confer appropriate rights, duties, and responsibilities on a provisional federal government of the territories of the future United States·of Indonesia. The United States of Indonesia, when created, will be a sovereign and independent state in equal partnership with the Kingdom of the Netherlands in a Netherlands-Indonesian Union at the head of which shall be the King of the Netherlands. The status of the Republic of Indonesia will be that of a state within the United States of Indonesia.
2. In any provisional federal government created prior to the ratification of the constitution of the future United States of Indonesia, all states will be offered fair representation.
3. Prior to the dissolution of the Committee of Good Offices, either party may request that the services of the committee be continued to assist in adjusting differences between the parties which relate to the political agreement and which may arise during the interim period. The other party will interpose no objection to such a request: This request would be brought to the attention of the Security Council of the United Nations by the Government of the Netherlands.
4. Within a period of not less than 6 months or more than 1 year from the signing of this agreement, a plebiscite will be held to determine whether the populations of the various territories of Java, Madura, and Sumatra wish their territory to form part of the Republic of Indonesia or of another state within the United States of Indonesia, such plebiscite to be conducted under observation by the Committee of Good Offices should either party, in accordance with the procedure set forth in paragraph 3 above, request the services of the committee in this capacity. The parties may agree that another method for ascertaining the will of the populations may be employed in place of a plebiscite.
5. Following the delineation of the states in accordance with the procedure set forth in paragraph 4 above, a constitutional convention will be convened, through democratic procedures, to draft a constitution for the United States of Indonesia. The representation of the various states in the convention will be in proportion to their populations.
6. Should any state decide not to ratify the constitution and desire, in accordance with the principles of articles 3 and 4 of the Linggadjati agreement, to negotiate a special relationship with the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, neither party will object.

In the six principles were the three things of deep concern to the republic: Specific references to the Republic of Indonesia by name as one of the states in the United States of Indonesia, fair representation of all states in the interim government, and guaranty of international observation in the period between the signing of the political agreement and the transfer of the recognized historic sovereignty of the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia. In addition were two new political principles. One of these provisions was that not sooner than 6 months and not later than 1 year after the signing of the agreement, plebiscites would be held under international observation for the self-determination of·the . people of the various territories of Java, Sumatra, and Madura as to whether they would form a part of the Republic of Indonesia or another state of the United States of Indonesia. The other additional basically democratic provision was that the representation in the constitutional convention would be in proportion to population which should mean that the new United States of Indonesia would not only be free and independent, but would also be democratic in structure, leadership, function, and services of, for, and by the people of Indonesia.

To reject would mean, according to the Dutch, not only the withdrawal of the 12 principles and the 6 principles of freedom, democracy, and cooperation, but would also mean the resumption by the Dutch of “liberty of action.” To accept, it was envisaged, would transfer the struggle from a provisional military demarcation line, which would disappear, to a democratic political line which would endure. The underground struggle of bitterness and hatred, killings and destruction, it was conceived, would be brought above ground for good will, production, the utilization of military budgets for long-range productive programs for the education, health, and the welfare of all the people of Indonesia. Acceptance would mean the cooperation of the Netherlands, the republican, and the non-republicans in the formation of the sovereign, free, and independent United States of Indonesia in the Union of equal nations in the United States.

In consideration of these things, the Netherlands and the republic accepted unconditionally the truce, the 12 principles and the 6. Members of the committee expressed their personal faith to the representatives of the Netherlands that the republic would, with increasing effectiveness, keep the truce in good faith and good will, and furthermore, that a considerable proportion of the able and dedicated Indonesian leaders were in the republic. They also expressed to representatives of the republic their personal faith that the sovereignty of the Netherlands in the interim period would not be used to fix in the new clothes of freedom the old body of colonialism, that the republic would not lose its existing status emphasized as one of the two parties in the Indonesian question on the agenda of the Security Council of the United Nations. Members of the committee advised both parties to subordinate all claims and issues, which would soon disappear or be absorbed in the permanent settlement, to the three main objectives of keeping the truce, restoring economic production and trade through mutual cooperation, and, not the least important of all, the negotiation of the political settlement for freedom, independence, and cooperation.

The Committee previously had hoped for the acceptance of its proposals set forth in the Christmas message, which was rejected by the Dutch as indicated. However, the Renville agreement is as fair and balanced as the circumstances and the required agreement of the two governments would permit. Necessarily basic and general in nature, together with the Linggadjati principles on which it was based, the Renville agreement provided the balanced foundation, on which, and the basic principles, with which, the parties themselves, with the guidance and assistance of the United Nations, could negotiate a great settlement for two great peoples. The status quo military lines were provisional and would gradually disappear; the democratic lines would advance and endure. Such was our faith. The one thing required was the good faith, good will, and initiative of both parties in seeking ways to make it work rather than little faith, ill will, and resourcefulness in seizing ways to make it fail. Both parties, with good faith and good will, could implement and make effective an incomplete agreement on the basis of great principles. One party can, with determination make even a perfect agreement fail.

XI. BASIS FOR GOOD WILL AND EARLY IMPLEMENTATION

Upon the signing of the Renville agreement many circumstances were propitious for peace and an early implementation. The armies stood peacefully on the status quo line as accepted by the Republic. The Republic had again accepted the federal principle for the formation of the United States of Indonesia. A moderate Republican Government had come into power and withstood severe tests. Approximately 35,000 combatant republicans had been successfully evacuated from behind Dutch lines, and Colonel Rigers, United States Army; Captain Mccallum, United States Navy; and other military, naval, and marine assistants of the several nations were most enthusiastic about the Republican achievement. On the eve of the signing of the Renville agreement, the spokesman for the Netherlands at The Hague had given public assurance of the opportunity for the activity of the United Nations Committee of Good Offices in the event of the consideration again of extreme measures. Since the Netherlands Government could not repeal and the committee could not sanction the violation of the standing ceasefire resolution of the Security Council, a denunciation of a particular truce would immediately place upon the two governments responsibility to find, with the assistance of the committee, some other way of implementing the standing ceasefire resolution of the Security Council. In addition to these safeguards of the peace, the Queen of the Netherlands, in the highest tradition of a humane people, gave her pronouncement from the throne: “Colonialism is dead.” The early implementation in negotiation of this noble declaration would strengthen the continued implementation of the truce.

There was no break in the presence, hard work, availability, and ability of the .committee on the ground. After the departure of the American representative and his chosen first assistant, Prof. Henry P. Brandis, the functions of the American representative were taken over by Mr. Joseph W. Scott and Mr. Charlton Ogburn, Jr., of the original American delegation. Mr. Glenn Abbey, of the American Consulate in Batavia, a member of the United States delegation, continued as the chairman of the Truce Committee; Colonel Myers, United States Army, in cooperation with Brigadier Neylan, of Australia, and Colonel Servais, of Belgium, and their allied colleagues and associates, observed the setting up of demilitarized zones and the evacuation of combatants. Unfortunately, .the parties themselves did not accelerate by agreement the opening up of communication, trade, and transportation to make available some of the goods desperately needed in the long-blockaded republic to provide necessities of life, health, and decency for the people, to allay the suspicions and unrest of extremists, and to provide tokens of cooperation between the Netherlands and the moderate republican government. There was also no real fulfillment of the freedom of assembly, speech, and publication at all times promised in the Renville agreement. With the growth of suspicion and unrest, the young revolutionary government, without the traditions of a strong stable government, could not always be sure of its own stability especially in the face of many delays and sudden breaks in negotiations. [note that Senator Graham’s original omitted number “XI” in his ordered list]

XII. Analysis of Three Controversial Issues

The lag in negotiations was due to a number of circumstances, such as the debates in the Security Council preceding its approval of the Renville agreement, the change in the composition of the Netherlands Government, the differences in the interpretations of some of the provisions of the Renville agreement, and the constant rejection by the Netherlands of the informal suggestions of the Committee of Good Offices. Three of the controversial issues involved sovereignty, separate organization of states, and the provisional government.

A. Sovereignty

The sovereignty of the Netherlands throughout the Netherlands East Indies, acknowledged in the first of the six principles, has never been questioned by the United Nations or by the member nations of the Committee of Good Offices or their representatives. In acknowledging this sovereignty the committee made clear its views, expressed to representatives of both Governments before the signing, with binding force on itself along, but nevertheless as the unanimous opinion of the Committee of Good Offices: That none of the principles could or were intended to alter the status of the Governments as the two parties to the Indonesian dispute on the agenda of the United Nations.

Neither the Dutch, in their over-all sovereignty, nor the Indonesian Republic in the exercise of their de facto authority, quite realize, that, except for the power of the United Nations in general, including the Chinese, the British-Indian and Russian forces in Asia; except for the gigantic American war production for the Pacific fighting; and except for the resistless vast assaults of the American armies, navies, air forces, and marines from Midway to the Solomons to the Philippines to Okinawa with the heroic cooperation of the Australians and New Zealanders, there would now be no over-all sovereignty of the Netherlands in the Dutch East Indies and no exercise of de facto authority by the republic within the republican areas of Java, Sumatra, and Madura. The Dutch Indies today would be the Japanese East Indies. Japanese totalitarian sovereignty would be now exercised over all Indonesia.

The legal sovereignty of the Netherlands in the Dutch East Indies is derived from history and international law but the actual exercise of sovereignty by the Netherlands in the East Indies proceeds now from the existence and the rights of the United Nations and their victorious armies. But for these, the Netherlands itself would be under the over-all sovereignty and tyranny of the Nazi totalitarian dictatorship. It is one of the ironies of history that the Netherlands should flout the orders of the United Nations from whose victories in World War II it derives not only its present sovereignty but its existence as a free nation.

After the surrender of the Japanese in the Netherlands East Indies to the representative of the allied command, the British general commanding the British forces and the Dutch units, fully aware of the historic over-all sovereignty of the Netherlands, yet confronted with the existence of the young republic, chose to deal with the republic as exercising de facto authority. This balancing of recognized sovereignty and actual equities was carried forward in the chairmanships of two British diplomats and in the continuing responsibilities of the Security Council which holds both the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia as the two parties to the Indonesian dispute on the agenda of the United Nations.

Within the limits of the republic, reduced not by negotiation or self-determination of peoples but by the arbitrary conquests of the “police action” of July 21, 1947, the republic continued to exercise de facto authority. The Renville agreement, formally adopted under the flags of Belgium, Australia, and the United States, on a public ship of the United States, under the auspices of the United Nations, was signed by the chairman of the Dutch delegation, on behalf of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and by the chairman of the Republican delegation on behalf of the Republic of Indonesia.

Both before and after the signing of the Renville agreement, the Republic, in its rightful exercise of de facto authority, had its own civil administration, revenues, currency, fiscal system, police, army, public works, public health, and public welfare agencies, radio and public information, schools and university, political parties, provisional assembly, cabinet, prime minister, and president.

After the signing of the truce, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, in its exercise of de facto authority evacuated 35;000 Republican combatants from behind Dutch military lines. More recently the Republic, in its exercise of de facto authority, with its own army unaided, crushed the Communist revolt against the Soekarno-Hatta moderate government. The very terms of the Renville agreement impose upon the Republic the duty of exercising de facto authority in the implementation of the agreement.

By solemn agreement of the Government of the Republic with the Government of the Netherlands, the United Nations is committed before the world by principle I of the Renville agreement: “That the assistance of the committee on good offices be continued in the working out and signing of an agreement for the settlement of the political dispute in the islands of Java, Sumatra, and Madura, based upon the principles underlying the Linggadjati agreement.” One of the principles underlying the Linggadjati agreement is stated in article I of the agreement as follows: “The Netherlands Government recognizes the Government of the Republic of Indonesia as exercising de facto authority over Java, Sumatra, and Madura.”

Unless the United Nations is to renounce the force of agreements for the force of arms, that pledge is still binding on the two governments. To renounce that obligation is to sanction defiance of its own orders, is to violate its own charter, and is to undermine its own foundations in the conscience of mankind. Even if renounced by the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Nations, the agreements, made in their name, will be upheld by a moral sovereignty which will yet prevail over the broken pledges of a kingdom, the combination of colonial powers, and the resulting frustration of the United Nations.

The second Dutch police action, which violated the Security Council resolutions of August 1, 1947, has shocked the conscience of mankind. This tragic action will yet serve to strengthen, in world opinion, the responsibility of the United Nations for the continuance of the dispute between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia on the agenda of the United Nations until the final settlement of the political dispute is made in accordance with the principles of civil liberties and self-determination of peoples to which both Governments are specifically pledged in the Linggadjati and the Renville agreements.

B. The Separate States

A persisting issue between the Government of the Netherlands and the Government of the Republic ls the status of the separate non-republican states. The Republican Declaration of Independence was for all the Indonesian peoples to be in one consolidated centralized government of the Republic of Indonesia. Under Dutch sponsorship separate Indonesian states were organized in the Great East or East Indonesia, which included the peoples on the many islands east of Java. Separatist movements likewise were organized in Borneo.

In article 4 of the Linggadjati agreement, the Republic agreed: “The component states of the United States of Indonesia shall be the Republic, Borneo, and the Great East, without prejudice to the right of the population of any territory to decide by a democratic procedure that its position in the United States of Indonesia shall be otherwise defined.” Article I provided: “The Netherlands Government recognizes the Government of the Republic of Indonesia as exercising the de facto authority over Java, Madura, and Sumatra. The areas, occupied by Allied or Netherlands forces shall be gradually incorporated, through mutual cooperation in the Republican Territory. To this end the necessary measures shall at once be taken in order that the incorporation shall be completed at the latest, on the date mentioned in article 12 (January 1, 1949).”

The Dutch police action of July 20, 1947, overran much of Java, Sumatra, and Madura. Behind the Dutch military lines large areas of territory and many millions of Indonesian people in Java, Sumatra, and Madura have since been held cut off from the Republic. Behind those lines in the former Republican territories Dutch-sponsored separatist movements have been under way in Java, Sumatra, and Madura. In the Christmas message informally presented to the parties on December 26, 1947, our unanimous committee recommended (in provision 2), pending the settlement of the political dispute, “that there be meanwhile a cessation of all activities by either Government relating directly or indirectly to the organization of states or to the determination of political relationship to the United States of Indonesia of territories in Java, Sumatra, and Madura which comprise the area involved in the dispute between the Government of the Netherlands and the Government of the Republic.”

In provision 3 of the Christmas message, the unanimous committee recommended: “That on the signing of the political agreement the civil administration which was functioning on July 30, 1947, be restored within a period of not more than 3 months and that within a similar period Netherlands armed forces be withdrawn to territories occupied by them on July 20, 1947.”

The Republic accepted the Christmas message with these provisions. The Netherlands rejected these provisions among others.

In the counterproposal of the 12 principles the Netherlands suggested in Principle I: “That the assistance of the Committee of Good Offices be continued in the working out and signing of an agreement for the settlement of the political dispute in the islands of Java, Sumatra, and Madura, based upon the principles underlying the Linggadjati agreement;” and in principle 2: “It is understood that neither party has the right to prevent the free expression of popular movements looking toward political organization which are in accord with the principles of the Linggadjati agreement. It is further understood that each party will guarantee the freedom of assembly, speech and publication at all times provided that this guarantee is not construed so as to include advocacy of violence or reprisals;” and in principle 8: “It is understood that decisions concerning changes in administration of territory should be made only with full and free consent of the population of those territories and at a time when the security and freedom from coercion of such populations will have been ensured.”

Accordingly the organization of autonomous states are not prohibited pending the settlement of the political dispute. The committee’s suggestion for prohibition meantime of such activities was rejected by the Netherlands. But the Renville agreement does not provide with regard to such activities (1) that the right that the free expression of popular movements shall not be prevented by either party; (2) that each party guarantee freedom of assembly, speech, and publication at all times; and (3) that decisions concerning changes in administration of territory should be made with the full and free consent of the populations of those territories; and in principle 4 of the six principles, that plebiscites (or another method by agreement of the parties) will be held, to determine whether the populations of the various territories of Java, Madura, and Sumatra wish their territory to form part of the Republic of Indonesia or another state within the United States of Indonesia, such plebiscite to be conducted under observation by the Committee of Good Offices should either party request such services.

The delineation of the territories in which plebiscites (or elections) were to be held naturally was left for the negotiations of the parties. Geography, history, traditions, administrative values, and the general sentiments of the population ·would doubtless be among the factors considered in the delineation of a territory. One of the basic principles of the Linggadjati agreement is that the composition of the United States of Indonesia shall be without prejudice of the right of the populations of any territory in a component state to decide by a democratic procedure that its position in the United States of Indonesia shall be otherwise defined. Both parties are not only committed to the four principles taken from the Linggadjati agreement and listed among the 12 principles, but are also committed to the working out and signing of an agreement based on the principles underlying the Linggadjati agreement. It would therefore be the right of any appropriate territory in the republic as well as any appropriate territory in any other component state to have the opportunity of self-determination of its relation to the republic or its relation to the United States of Indonesia or a special relation to the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The people themselves in the appropriate territories are to decide. If both the parties involved wish to use some method other than plebiscites they may agree upon the democratic procedures to be used for such self-determination of the people. The republic by the Linggadjati principle is no exception to this procedure.

C. The provisional government

As pointed out in our report to the Security Council one of the obstacles in the way of acceptance by the republic of the 12 principles, which were the Dutch counterproposals to the committee’s Christmas message, was the fact that they contained no mention of the republic. In the additional six principles proposed by the committee it was provided in principle 2 that: In any provisional government created prior to the ratification of the constitution of the new United States of Indonesia all states will be offered fair representation. The Netherlands proposed and the republic accepted the reservation: That point 2 (principle 2 of the six) will become operative after the signing of the political agreement envisaged in this document.

Postponing the operation of principle 2 until after the signing of the political agreement did not make a change in the substance of the principle of fair representation. Principle 2, with the reservation, requires that, in any provisional government created prior to the ratification of the constitution and after the signing of the political agreement, all states will be offered fair representation. It is presumed that, if for any remotely possible reason overlooked by the constitutional convention, a provisional government were created after the ratification of the constitution and before the transfer of sovereignty, the parties would, as a matter of common sense, agree on the basis of the established precedent, that, in such a provisional government, all states would be offered fair representation. The change in the time of its operability does not cause principle 2 to read that, in any provisional government set up at any other time, all states will be offered fair representation except the Republic of Indonesia.

Under the Netherlands right in principle 1 to confer “appropriate rights, duties, and responsibilities upon a provisional Federal Government” prior to the transfer of sovereignty the language does not read “what the Netherlands Government deems to be appropriate rights, duties, and responsibilities.”

Moreover, even by unilateral decision it would not be a conferring of appropriate rights on a provisional government—if one should be set up after the ratification of the constitution and before the transfer of sovereignty or if one should be set up before the signing of the political agreement—to grant the right of fair representation in the provisional government to all states except the Republic of Indonesia.

To arrogate to sovereignty such arbitrarily discriminatory power or to confer upon any provisional government the right to exclude a particular one of the states from fair representation would not only not be appropriate, it would, by any interpretation, be most inappropriate and destructive of reasonable negotiations by its unfair discrimination against this particular state.

Such a position cannot be deduced from the common language of the agreement, or from common sense or from common fairness that only the states which were or are sponsored by the Dutch, no one of which was given a hearing before the United Nations, are the only Indonesian states which will be offered fair representation in a provisional government set up before the signing of the political agreement. To hold that the Republic of Indonesia, the only Indonesian state, which in its continuing exercise of de facto authority, has been and still is a party to the dispute on the agenda of the United. Nations and which is the only Indonesian state which has been and still is given hearings by the Security Council, is to be the only Indonesian state denied fair representation in such a provisional government is, by a simple analysis, a clearly inappropriate and unjust use of arbitrary power, characteristic of the sovereignty of a totalitarian state rather than the sovereignty of a democratic nation.

Negotiations for the implementation of the “Renville” agreement

Before the last remaining members of the original Committee of Good Offices at Batavia boarded the plane late in January for Lake Success, four committees representing the two governments were set up on (1) security and the truce; (2) political provision; (3) economics and finance; and (4) repatriation, movement of persons, and other such social and administrative matters. Clearly unprepared for the remarkably successful evacuation of approximately 35,000 Republican combatants from behind Dutch military lines, the Netherlands did not bring forward a plan for political discussions until about the middle of March. The series of working papers then submitted by the two governments were so widely at variance that they resulted only in impasse. To provide a basis for discussions, the du Bois-Critchley plan was informally submitted to the parties.

XIII. THE DU BOIS-CRITCHLEY PLAN

The du Bois-Critchley plan provided a wide solution of the vexing problem of the delineation of state boundaries prior to plebiscites or elections. One or more electors in proportion to the population were to be elected from all the smallest administrative units throughout Indonesia. These chosen electors would then get together on the next highest administrative level and elect delegates to the Constituent Assembly which would be both the provisional legislative assembly and the constitutional convention.

This provisional parliament (1) would, on the basis of geography, ethnography, history, tradition, and sentiment of peoples, delineate the states of the new United States of Indonesia; (2) would elect the President who would appoint the Prime Minister who would, in turn, form a Cabinet responsible to the provisional parliament; (3) and would have full powers of self-government including the command of all Indonesian armed forces.

The Netherlands High Commissioner would retain certain veto rights and have power to declare an emergency in a situation beyond the control of the provisional government in which case he would have the power to command the armed forces. The Constituent Assembly, as the provisional parliament, would, with the Netherlands, frame a statute of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union which would safeguard legitimate economic, cultural, and military interests of each country in the other and provide the framework for cooperation of the two governments in all fields of common interest. As the constitutional convention, the Constituent Assembly would write the Constitution of the United States of Indonesia. When the constitution and the statutes of the union be ratified, the Netherlands would transfer sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia.

The Republic accepted the principles of the plan for negotiations. The Netherlands refused to discuss the plan, alleging that the committee had violated its own rules of procedure even in submitting the plan confidentially without being requested to do so by both parties. On June 16 the Netherlands, alleging that the committee was guilty of leaking the plan to the press, broke off negotiations. This allegation was vigorously denied and was never established.

In view of the fact that for 6 weeks afterward the Netherlands would neither discuss the du Bois-Critchley plan nor submit a counterplan, the representatives of the Republic withdrew from what they considered an empty situation. All these matters were faithfully reported to the Security Council. On July 4, Mr. Coert du Bois, an able public servant of the United States and the United Nations, who had damaged his health with devoted and arduous work, returned to America with the deep appreciation of those who knew him best. His American colleagues and their Australian and Belgian associates, meanwhile, continued available for the assistance of the parties when they again might feel the obligation to keep the promise made in the first of the 12 principles of the Renville agreement. Mr. Merle Cochran, the able American career diplomat, was appointed the successor of du Bois. Finding that all negotiations were still off, with no promise of resumption Cochran submitted an American plan.

XIV. THE COCHRAN PLAN

The Cochran plan for the implementation of the Renville agreement was presented by the new American representative who came with a fresh view and a sincere purpose to submit a fair and balanced proposal. After a thorough study of the situation he submitted an American plan based largely on the du Bois-Critchley plan with the sympathetic approval of the stanch and able Critchley. The original American-Australian plan was composed of recommendations of what the main provisions of the political agreement should be. The American plan is a draft agreement itself, definite and precise. One of the few important differences is that the Netherlands High Commissioner, to declare an emergency in the interim period must have the consent of the Indonesian President or Prime Minister. It is considered by neutral observers to be a fair, reasonable, and practical implementation of the basic principles of the Renville agreement.

The American plan was submitted informally to the parties on September 10 as a committee working paper. The Republic fairly promptly accepted it as a basis for negotiations. The Netherlands in the middle of October accepted it as a basis for negotiations with such drastic amendments as to change the whole nature of the plan, with another dead end in negotiations.

XV. PATTERN OF ELECTIONS AND DELAYS

Time worked most heavily against the weaker government. In the summary record of the negotiations with the Republic, or lack of negotiations, and of the use of the assistance of the Committee of Good Offices, or lack of use, is revealed a Dutch policy pattern of delay and attrition. In the negotiations for the implementation of the Renville agreement the Dutch rejected the major proposals of the Committee of Good Offices, broke off negotiations over a long period, and refused or failed to use the committee in violation of the first principle of the Renville agreement. The Netherlands Government used the policy of delay to carry on what the Republicans considered a program of economic strangulation instead of the opening of trade as provided for in the agreement and a policy of political fragmentations which were more Dutch-sponsored than the free expressions of popular movements promised in the Renville agreement.

These delays did not help the moderate Hatta government in its need of tokens of progress in negotiations and in need of strength against extremist elements. The policy pattern of delay and broken negotiations had caused unrest and a major incident in the Republic. The Communists seized the opportunity thus presented by the Dutch to stir up an insurrection against the moderate Hatta government. President Soekarno and Prime Minister Hatta used the Republican Army, with the backing of the whole Government and all the major political parties, to crush decisively the Communist revolt. This was a real demonstration of stability and strength by this moderate government caught between the Dutch delays and the Communist insurrection. While other governments with aid from the democracies failed to stop the Communist march, the blockaded Republic of Indonesia, without aid from any source, crushed the Communist uprising.

XVI. INCIDENTS

In any situation involving the complex relation of human beings and the more complicated relation of governments, no one side is apt to be without blame. There have been atrocities on both sides. A young revolutionary Republic, with the responsibilities of exercising de facto authority in the effectuation of a truce and in negotiation for the implementation of an agreement, is not able to achieve conditions of law and order as completely as itself desires. The long-established Netherlands East Indies Government with its longer administrative authority and experience, its superior resources, its military conquests, its mechanized forces, and its stakes in the status quo, is in a stronger position to maintain law and order more completely within its territories. The very fact of the military conquests of July 21, 1947, and the non-implementation of the two agreements, created a .sense of injustice which cruelly makes for incidents and atrocities deplored by all decent people. The military conquest of July 21, 1947, in the eyes of the conquered, was itself a major atrocity.

It is tragically in the nature of revolutionary movement that even the greatest revolutions are accompanied by incidents and atrocities. The great American and French Revolutions were not exceptions to atrocious accomplishments, especially in the irregular fighting of Tories and Revolutionists in America and in the conflicts of the forgotten millions and the privileged groups in France. The actions of lawless bands or the atrocious Incitements of a few irresponsible military leaders are not to be excused. They do not have the approval of the humane people of the Republic and merit the condemnation of us all. Almost all the incidents cited against the Republic occurred behind the Dutch lines in territories under Dutch control. The Dutch had the authority and responsibility under the truce to punish any such offenders against the truce and any such perpetrators of wrongs against the property and lives of people.

The best way to have stopped incidents, so far as their source was from within the Republic, was, not by military conquest of a moderate government, but was through progress in negotiations with a moderate government whose leaders include some of the noble spirits of our time.

XVII. THE COMMUNIST REVOLT CRUSHED

This moderate Republican Government immediately showed its good faith and strength by evacuating an estimated 35,000 Republican combatants from behind the Dutch lines without major incidents. In spite of the fact that time itself, with its blockage and splinter movements, was working against the Republic, in spite of the suspicion and unrest caused by delays in negotiations, and in spite even of long periods of broken negotiations, this moderate Republican Government only a few months ago decisively met head-on a major incident in its own territories, crushed the Communist insurrection, and reasserted its de facto authority to carry on negotiations to implement the Renville agreement.

XVIII. THE BREAKING OF THE TRUCE

Instead of resuming on the basis of either the American-Australian plan, or on the basis of its later modification in the American plan, under the auspices and with the ready assistance of the Committee of Good Offices, composed of fair and able men devoted to the purposes of the United Nations, the Government of the Netherlands refused to carry out the first principle of the Renville agreement in which it promised: “That the assistance of the Committee of Good Offices be continued in the working out and signing of an agreement for the settlement of the political dispute in the islands of Java, Sumatra, and Madura, based upon the principles underlying the Linggadjati agreement.”

Instead of using the ways of peace and negotiation, the present Government of the Netherlands, in the face of one of the most conciliatory attitudes ever expressed by the prime minister of one government to another, demanded the unreserved surrender of the Republic on all main points of difference within 48 hours. With possibilities of an agreement with the assistance of the Committee of Good Offices by no means exhausted, the Netherlands Government reduced its 48-hour ultimatum to 24 hours. With such a 24-hour ultimatum the truce was broken. No effective notice was given either to the committee or to the Republican Government. Facilities were denied to the American representative in Batavia to notify the committee then meeting at Kaliurang 13 miles from the Republican capital. Facilities were denied·to the Republican representatives in Batavia to notify his Government at Djokjakarta. The attack was suddenly launched. The leaders of the Republican Government, only 13 miles distant from the Committee of Good Offices of the United Nations, were taken completely by surprise. The whole Cabinet was captured.

The breaking of the truce violated the Renville agreement. The launching of the attack violated the Security Council’s resolution of August 1, 1947. Mr. Philip Jessup, the United States representative on the Security Council, has made clear that the attack was unwarranted, that it violated the Renville agreement, and that it violated the Security Council ceasefire resolution of August 1, 1947. Mr. Merle Cochran in his reports to the Security Council made it explicitly clear that the breaking of the truce was without effective notice and violated the terms of the Renville agreement. The fundamental balance of the Renville agreement was also broken. The democratic lines, which were promised to advance, receded before the attacker; and the military line, which were promised soon gradually to recede in peace, advanced in military conquest. Instead of ballots being substituted for bullets, in fulfillment of solemn declarations, bullets were substituted for ballots in violation of the two agreements.

As clearly as the breaking of the truce was and is a violation of the Renville agreement, it also is clear that the launching of the attack was and is a violation of the Security Council’s cease-fire resolution of August 1, 1947. That the attack was a violation of the resolution of August the first is made clear beyond any possible question in its resolution of November the first, in which the Council “advises the parties concerned, the Committee of Good Offices, and the Consular Commission that its resolution of August 1 should be interpreted as meaning that the use of armed forces by either party by hostile action to extend its control over territory not occupied by it on August 4, 1947, is inconsistent with the Council’s resolution of August 1, 1947.” The Government of the Netherlands has used its armed forces by hostile action to extend its own control beyond the August lines of 1947.

The breaking of the truce violated the Renville agreement. The attack violated the Security Council resolution of August 1. The terms of the ultimatum violated the most elemental sense of human decency. The reduction of the Dutch ultimatum to 24 hours was in simple, human terms, in effect, a demand that the Prime Minister of the Republic get out of a sickbed in Kaliurang, where the Committee of Good Offices was in session, travel in the evening over a difficult, partly mountainous road to the Republican capital, convene his Cabinet and parliamentary working committee, and have an unconditional surrender on all main points of differences in Dutch hands in Batavia by 10 o’clock next morning. The first that the majority of the members of the United Nations Committee of Good Offices at Kaliurang knew of the attack was when they saw the bombs falling on the capitol of the Republic of Indonesia. The committee was at that time denied facilities to notify the Security Council for an emergency meeting.

The heroic heights of the historic traditions of liberty and honor and the noble heights of the humane spirit of the Dutch people over the centuries will forever measure the depths to which some responsible Dutch officials dragged down the good name of a great people. The people of the Netherlands will yet repudiate these officials who misrepresented their noble name before the world. The peoples of the western European democracies will repudiate the votes of their governments in the Security Council which supported for a time the crushing of the Republic of Indonesia and buried for a time the principles and procedures of the Charter of the United Nations. The ghosts of Ethiopia and Manchuria from the tomb of the old League of Nations haunt today the chambers of the United Nations. The Assembly of the United Nations will yet call to the judgment bar of mankind all those who, with force of arms, defy the orders of the United Nations to cease fire and resume the procedures of peace. The United Nations, in the face of a threat to the peace of the world, cannot by drift or default, escape the obligations of its great Charter which holds that nations with dependent territories are accountable to the world community.

The officials of the Netherlands Government disregarded the United Nations Committee of Good Offices, broke the Renville agreement, violated the Security Council resolution of August 1, 1947, attacked without effective warning the Republic of Indonesia and defied the United Nations, because all these, in fulfillment of international obligations, stood across the road of an unwarranted attack on the Government of the Republic in the islands where cross the roads of freedom and peace in the world.

This violation of the United Nations order stands out in the perspective of two attacks. The Communists failed to break the stanch ranks of the moderate Republican Government. Taking advantage of the Dutch rejections, delays, and broken negotiations, the Communists sought to undermine and overthrow the Republican Government. Word came from Moeso, a Moscow-trained Indonesian, for the Communist uprising against the moderate Republican Government. The Republican Government, without outside aid, crushed the Communist revolt.

The Dutch failed by rejection of neutral proposals, delays, broken negotiations, economic strangulation, and political fragmentation, to break down the moderate but stanch Republican Government as it tried to hold the line for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Word came from The Hague for a sudden attack against the Republican Government. The Republic was crushed in the field but will rise again in the power of the moral opinion of mankind.

XIX. THE RENVILLE AGREEMENT AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The procedures of the United Nations and the principles of the Linggadjati and Renville agreements will rise again in this desperate but still hopeful world, which, under God, is patiently in the making.

Word from The Hague indicates that the Netherlands Government is at long last considering the resumption of negotiations. It is the responsibility of the United Nations to make sure that in such negotiations the President and the Prime Minister of the Republic and their associates are restored to their capital and have equal freedom of negotiations under the auspices and according to the principles and the procedures of the United Nations Committee on Indonesia.

The Vandenberg amendment to the ECA bill proposes to tie the ECA to the Charter of the United Nations by incorporating in this amendment section 5 of article 2 of the Charter which provides that: “All members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.” We thus, as far as possible, keep our procedures within the framework of the United Nations in the exact language of the Charter. This amendment will serve to support and strengthen the United Nations in its heavy responsibility in dealing with the complex Indonesian question.

The Indonesian story is not a one-sided story, all black or all white on either side. Though the Indonesian story has its hopeful lights and tragic shadows on both sides, it is yet written in the record of the United Nations that it has been mainly the Dutch representatives who have delayed and delayed in the negotiations, rejected and rejected suggestions made by representatives of the United Nations, and defied and defied orders of the Security Council. It is our faith that increasingly large groups of forward-looking and humane people of the Netherlands, with its noble and heroic traditions, are yearning for an early and fair settlement of this increasingly tragic and destructive dispute. We look to both Governments now to follow through in good faith for a decent compliance with the procedures of the United Nations. In case the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia fail to fulfill the hopeful promises within a reasonable time, it is the sense of a large body in the United States Senate that the Security Council should so report to the world, and that the American representative should, along with his colleagues in the Security Council, take the lead for the adoption of enforcement procedures.

The adoption of enforcement procedures by the Security Council in accordance with this amendment, expressed in the identical language of the Charter, would then obligate the United States and other member nations to withdraw any assistance from a government against which the measures of enforcement were proceeding. In this way there would be brought to bear against a defiant member nation not the unilateral action of one nation but the united action of all nations in the United Nations. If any colonial power, in the face of the moral opinion of the world, should veto the resolution for enforcement procedures, then both the nation which defies and the nation which vetoes should be brought to the moral judgment bar of that great forum of world opinion, the General Assembly of the United Nations. If it should develop that the present fair words should become a cover for more delay, rejection, and defiance, and if the United Nations fails after the exhaustion of its procedures to secure compliance, we believe the Administrator of the ECA would be in moral position to use his executive power with regard to ECA funds in a way made appropriate by such failures.

Senator BREWSTER has performed a public service in bringing the Indonesian question to the floor of the Senate. I am strongly in favor of his position but do not consider this the proper time for his amendment. It now appears, on the assurances of the Secretary of State, that representatives of the two governments are to resume negotiations at an early date.

At the time of the shameful attack by the Netherlands on the Republic of Indonesia, in violation both of the Renville agreement and the ceasefire order August 1, 1947, and the subsequent defiance of the United Nations, I thought that ECA aid should have been cut off, not only to the East Indies, but to the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Since the ECA aid was not cut off to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, during the period of Dutch defiance, it is not now appropriate to cut off such aid when this defiance seems to be coming to an end and negotiations between the two governments are in the process of being resumed. Now that the officials at whose instance this most reprehensible attack was made are being replaced by men of more understanding and good will, the timing of the amendment might have consequences that would not now best serve the purpose for which it is intended. Furthermore, we have time to consider, for all practical purposes, the substance of this amendment after the negotiating officials have had time to prove the real intent and substance of the fair assurances now given in press dispatches from the Netherlands and from Indonesia. In the present circumstances we should trust the good faith of these dispatches. In case our faith in their good faith proves to be unjustified, we have time in the later consideration of the appropriation for ECA to effectuate the intent of this amendment without now appearing to doubt the good faith of these latest assurances.

In this complex situation in which so much depends on good faith, let us build on good faith and fair hopes wherever we can find them. The Secretary of State has expressed his confidence in the good faith of the present assurances and his hope for the real resumption of negotiations for a peaceful settlement of this protracted and tragic dispute. In the light of developments, we can return to the purpose of the Brewster amendment with more timeliness and no less effectiveness.

By the blood of the sons of the Netherlands, by the blood of the sons of Indonesia who struggled and died in the heroic Dutch underground for the freedom of the Netherlands, by the proclamations of the beloved Queen and the commitments of the Ministers of the Netherlands, by the struggles and brave hopes of the Republic, by the national aspirations of the people of Indonesia, and by the needs of the world and the responsibility of the Security Council, the truce must be restored and the political principles must be fulfilled in the freedom, independence, and cooperation of these two great peoples in one of the great commonwealths of free and equal nations of our modern world.

Larger destiny

In the restoration of the peace and the Renville principles, the people of the Netherlands, the people of the Republic, and all the people of Indonesia have, under God, a rendezvous with a larger destiny of creative cooperation in a time and in a world in need of the best which these historic peoples can give together. May they not fail mankind in this desperate hour. Rather may they rise to the responsibility of their power and the opportunity for their greatness to give fresh hopes of food and freedom to the hungry and fearful people of the earth who, looking to the east, would lift their eyes in prayer toward the morning of their hopes for a freer and fairer world.